Monday, January 12, 2009

Boston's Hancock Tower Goes Into Default


Broadway Partners, the heavily indebted private equity firm that purchased Boston’s landmark Hancock Tower at the top of the market in 2006 defaulted on a key loan payment last week. The iconic office building is a trophy property in the heart of Boston's Back Bay district. The real estate fund manager purchased the property for $1.3 billion from Beacon Capital Partners, but the office tower now appears to be headed toward foreclosure.

Defunct Lehman Brothers, described a few months ago by the New York Times as a "real estate ATM" arranged a $472 million mezzanine loan to help fund the acquisition, behind Royal Bank of Scotland's first mortgage in the amount of $640 million. The RBS loan was arranged by its real estate affiliate, Greenwich Capital Markets. The Boston Globe reported earlier that the property was worth no more than $1 billion, according a local real estate executive with access to the numbers.

Of course, the Lehman and RBS loans were both short-term variable rate deals based on "pro-forma rent" and occupancy levels. With the tower about to report a 15% vacancy rate this month, it's unlikely that it came even close to meeting the original rent growth assumptions in the pro forma, and rents are likely to keep going down, not up.

The building is the tallest tower in New England and also features a 2,000 stall parking garage. Betwen 2002 and 2007, Broadway Partners spent more than $13 billion buying up trophy office towers across the country, including large trophy assets in New York and San Francisco.

The firm's founder got his start in 2000, with the purchase of an old school building in Hartsdale, New York for less than $5 million, which is basically the real estate equivalent of buying penny stocks. But his luck has now run out, and he and his firm are racing to sell whatever assets they can while they still can. The firm's deal to sell a San Francisco office tower has been stalled since May of 2008, and it now looks unlikely to close at all unless accompanied by the sound of a gavel.

According to the Boston Herald, Broadway Partners issued a statement yesterday in an attempt to calm the nerves of its institutional investors, all of whom look increasingly likely to take a big haircut on the relationship:

“Despite difficult market conditions, we continue to work hard with our lenders and partners to address debt obligations,” the statement read. “In the meantime, Broadway Partners continues to operate great buildings with high service standards.”

Under the terms of Broadway’s mortgage, a default gives Greenwich the right to potentially sell the Hancock Tower, auction it off or take over the building’s management and rental income. Given the rapidly weakening economy, neither option is likely to result in full recovery. For a more background on why, click on the post relating to commercial real estate values in this market. As a consequence of those economics and the bloodletting that needs to occur, Moody's sees no bottom in commercial real estate until 2010.

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7 Comments:

Anonymous Anonymous said...

i believe the 640mm first loan from RBS is not a short term variable loan. its a 10 year interest only loan that was securitized in the GG9 deal.

January 12, 2009 1:41 PM  
Anonymous Anonymous said...

also, where did you get your info that it was underwriten to pro-forma? i cant find that...i looked thru the term sheet and did not see any evidence of pro forma.
i see it was underwriten to 95% occy, vs 99% actual. underwriten dscr was 1.30, vs a recent servicer reported dscr (first half of 2008 reported cash flow) of about 1.30.
if the vacancy rate is now about 15%, sounds like they lost tenants.(was 99% occupied 6 months ago)

January 12, 2009 3:09 PM  
Anonymous Anonymous said...

"...two large tenants, Marsh & McLennan Cos. and the advertising firm Hill Holliday, vacated space totaling 252,000 square feet, about 15 percent of the total space, after Broadway Partners took over."

http://www.boston.com/realestate/news/articles/2008/12/10/hancock_towers_owner_finds_itself_in_a_crunch_as_rents_fail_to_cover_debt/?page=2

the mezz debt had two 6 month extention options, the last of which matures in jan 2009.


so, it sounds like what really is going on with this loan is that it was not underwriten to proforma, but rather has lost some tenants in 2008 and hasnt been able to replace them. and now its short term mezz debt is coming due which is out of extention options.

January 12, 2009 11:13 PM  
Blogger REIT Wrecks said...

I appreciate your comments, but it's unclear to me why you're defending this deal. It is the very embodiment of 2006 excess. I don't have access to the term sheet, so your information on specific transaction terms is more current than mine, but it seems to me the results speak for themselves.

January 13, 2009 6:43 PM  
Anonymous Anonymous said...

where did i defend (or not defend)the deal?

"..it seems to me the results speak for themselves."
they dont for me, which is why i was trying to get the facts straight so i could develop an informed opinion.

you do have access to the term sheet and all the info, its in the prospectus which was filed with the SEC 2 years ago. the hard part would be finding the transaction its in (GCCFC 2007-GG9). a google search is how i figured it out.

January 13, 2009 11:01 PM  
Blogger REIT Wrecks said...

Sorry, when you said "term sheet", I inferred that you were affiliated with the lender or the borrower, which is partly why I thought you were defending it. Apologies for that!

What you were looking at online was the preliminary prospectus from GCCFC 2007-GG9 (I think), which is not what I would normally refer to as a term sheet. But you're right, I do have access to it and there are some interesting aspects to this deal that, with the considerable benefit of hindsight, pretty much doomed it from the start. This was incredibly risky. Everything had to go right for Broadway Partners for it to work, and the exact opposite is what happened.

Yes, the "term sheet" disclosed underwritten DSCR of 1.31x, but that was only on the FIRST mortgage. That mortgage was only $640.5 million, which was 50% LTV. However, there was a second mortgage in the amount of $723,806,033, at LIBOR plus 3.94%, with a LIBOR floor 5% on the first $300MM. LIBOR is variable, but if you conservatively assume a blended rate of 7.25% on this loan, the DSCR at closing was actually about .50%. This means they were in the hole every year to the tune of $47MM until they could refinance or sell. Broadway Partners is reputed to be a flipper, and it looks like that was the business plan on this deal.

Without access to the real term sheet it's hard to know for certain, but the second mortgage looks like an equity bridge loan that was intended to get them from point A (control of the asset) to point B (sell to the next guy in line).

The terms of the first mortgage required that when the second was replaced, the new second mortgage had to have minimum combined DSCR of 1.15%. The RBS loan could not be prepaid, but it could be defeased as of April 2009. This implies that Broadway Partners hoped to be out of this deal by then.

Interestingly enough, there are all sorts of work-out possibilities here. That first is probably still performing (tenants pay rent directly to a lender lock-box), but in technical default due to the mezz payment default. I'm sure the mezz loan carcass will be sold at pennies on the dollar, but that would give the buyer the right to assume the first mortgage and own the asset.

That would get the buyer an existing first mortgage at 5.599% and 50% LTV on a 20% vacant class A office tower in the Back Bay, which is a pretty good deal on debt in today's market. And the first mortgage lender doesn't even get their toe stubbed!

January 14, 2009 7:45 PM  
Anonymous Anonymous said...

no problem
i am not with the lender or borrower and have no personal/professional interest in any way to this particular loan. just curious

i refer to the the term sheet as the detailed writeup on the top ten loans, usually attached to the prospectus...as in this case.

yes, the mezz is probably not a piece of paper i would be excited about owning. although i believe its backed by additional equity interest in several other properties besides the Hancock, but we dont know much about these, so its hard to say.

from the looks of the deal, i am guessing the original play was to replace the 30% of sf tenant leases rolling in 2008/2009 at higher rents, and then either sell the property (as you think they were flippers) or hold and enjoy the increased cash flow and replace the mezz debt.

my guess is they defaulted on the mezz (not the first i believe) in hopes that the mezz owner would be motivated to negotiate and modify/extend it rather than sell for pennies in this market.

January 14, 2009 11:45 PM  

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