FASB Amends Fair Market Value Accounting

Governments around the world have gone on a coordinated offensive of truculent press releases in an effort to combat the growing credit crisis. Mortgage REIT prices also popped again on Friday, NCT was up over 60%, RAS and RSO were both up over 30% and NRF was up almost 40%. But this is not the first time this has happened in REIT land, which has basically been short heaven for 18 months. Three weeks ago, NCT was the largest percentage gainer on the NYSE, almost doubling as shorts rushed to cover. Last week however, NCT was pushed back below $3 in a renewed and relentless selling assault. But this week should signal the beginning of the end of the easy short pickings in Mortgage REITs.

The price floor will be put in with the worldwide, coordinated focus on the problem, including the U.S. Treasury's new focus on direct recapitalization of U.S. banks with a voluntary program of government-sponsored equity investments and world-wide guarantees of interbank lending. The U.S Treasury's direct equity approach not only avoids the politically awkward "socialization" of private bank losses by allowing potential government equity participation in a recovery, but it also allows the banks to exercise some discretion in terms of selling assets into a fire sale market. However, the treasury is also moving forward on its program of purchasing both mortgage backed securities and whole mortgage loans.

There were numerous other news items this morning, but few as relevant to beleaguered REIT investors as the staff position rushed out by FASB entitled "Determining the Fair Value of a Financial Asset When the Market for That Asset Is Not Active". The guidance was rushed because regulators and policy makers wanted it out in time for companies to use in computing third quarter earnings, which should make this earnings season incredibly interesting - yet AGAIN!

The FASB staff position clarifies the application of FAS 157 where there are limited or no observable inputs for marking certain assets to market. The guidance does not eliminate Fair Market Value Accounting, but it does provide management with much more discretion with respect applying the convention when pricing illiquid assets. This discretion includes ability to use internal assumptions with respect to future cashflows, which would mean employing generally more benign estimates than what the "market" is currently imposing (see Is Commercial Real Estate Really Dead?).

The guidance specifically allows management to use internal cash flow models and assumptions to estimate fair value when there is limited market data available, or market data that is characterized by extremely wide "bid-ask" spreads.

"When an active market for a security does not exist, the use of management estimates that incorporate current market participant expectations of future cash flows, and include appropriate risk premiums, is acceptable," according to the FASB.

Determining whether a market is or isn't active requires judgment based on factors such as the spread between buyers and sellers. It provides that transactions in inactive markets "may be inputs when measuring fair value, but would likely not be determinative."

Another issue addressed by the guidance is how much weight to give to distressed sales when estimating the fair value of holdings. The guidance specifies that distressed sales or forced liquidations "are not orderly transactions" and "are not determinative when measuring fair value."

The guidance emphasizes transaction-level analysis, allowing performing transactions to be marked according to the value of that particular asset. Accordingly, these performing deals will no longer be considered "stressed" simply because the entire market is stressed. For commercial mortgage assets, including whole loans and CMBS, this allows management to consider overall default rates (still at historical lows), collateral characteristics and the underlying obligors on each underlying mortgage. Applying this discretion to portfolios that have few, if any, defaults and high quality collateral will obviously result in meaningful increases in GAAP earnings this quarter compared to previous quarters as previous distressed marks are reversed.

This amendment is huge for financials and for REITs in particular. The wholesale elimination of Fair Market Accounting would have removed a critical component of transparency from our markets, which obviously would have been detrimental. But amending it in such a way as to prevent portfolio valuations from being held hostage by a "market" that refuses to function is a constructive step. Now more than ever, management quality will be key in evaluating REIT investments. But for those REITs that make the grade, we could very well see a Mortgage REIT melt-up that could rival the melt down that has been in progress for so long.

Newcastle's High Yield Going Higher?

The gap between the perception of the risks in mortgage debt and the actual risks is now the exact opposite of where it was just before the credit crunch began.

Let's see, there are a few positive things happening out there and I think I need to write about them before my prescription runs out...

First, it's an election year and not too difficult to make a connection between the calendar and the $300 billion loan modification program housing bill that just passed. We also have 2% Fed Funds rate, and a whole slew of obscure but hugely important Fed programs aimed at restoring liquidity. These programs are unprecedented in scope, and all of it marks a big turnaround from the laissez-faire 5,000 former bear stearns employees days of "largely contained" subprime morgage defaults.

Things will turn around though, they always do, and I think Newcastle is one REIT that may be turning around sooner that some others. I sold NCT late in 2007, which sadly I cannot attribute to any unique insight. I simply got a margin call. That proved to be serendipitous, and a rare bit of good luck for me in what has been an otherwise miserable several months for NCT. In July, the stock hit $4.50.

But Newcastle is no Alesco, and I've been interested in developments there ever since the REIT cut its dividend to less than half its taxable income. REITs are required to pay out 90% of their taxable income to shareholders, so what were they planning to do with all that cash, assuming it wasn't burned up with more losses? Could a special dividend be on the way?

That became an even more pertinent question this quarter, when NCT reported operating earnings (Non-GAAP) which were twice the dividend yet again, a big jump in cash, to $170 million, and $88 million in debt reduction, $57 of which was recourse. 13% of NCTs debt now remains recourse to the Company (less, on a percentage basis, than AHR), and half of that consists of recourse debt on liquid, AAA-implied agency securities.

The Company is also in a similar position to Northstar (The Mortgage REIT With $4 Billion Of Sweet CDOs) with respect to its CDO assets. As loans inside NCT's CDOs get paid off, NCT has been busy replacing them with new assets that are yielding 2-3% more (N.B., NCT's funding costs do not go up, because the poor sots who own the CDOs are stuck with their miserable LIBOR +50). NCT replaced $63 million of CDO assets in the second quarter, and they expect the higher yields on this $63 million alone will generate an additional .06/share annually in earnings.

The Company is also working on further debt reductions, which may occur through asset sales. By the end of the third quarter, if all goes according to plan, NCT plans to be back out in the market aggressively acquiring new assets. They see three primary opportunities, either (1) the repurchase of common stock, which may be the most accretive, (2) the continued repurchase of CDO debt, or (3) the acquisition of new mortgage assets. Obviously, with market spreads being what they are, the ability to do any one of these three things could prove to be lucrative.

That's the good news, and everybody already knows the bad news - or at least they should. In March of 2007, NCT made a contrarian call on the single family mortgage market and announced a $1.7 billion purchase of subprime mortgages. Out of the entire portfolio, almost 40% of the mortgages were in California and Florida.

Back then, the stock was trading at $27. They eventually kicked out $400 million in mortgages - let's hope they were in Stockton and Bakersfield - and closed on $1.3 in May, intending to securitize the loans and retain a $75 million residual. That never happened, and the value of those securities (among other things in their portfolio) clearly kept dropping. NCT was forced to raise cash by selling $1.8 billion of assets in Q1, including $770 million of agency-backed mortgages, which is the good stuff (implied AAA), and take huge write downs on much of the rest of their portfolio they couldn't sell.

Those write downs continued in the second quarter, and in the end the write downs can also be a big driver of taxable income. The question swirling around NCT right now is how big a driver. NCT has now covered their full year dividend nut with just six months of operating earnings. The Company wouldn't give guidance on full year taxable income, but they have consistently said that they intend to make distributions such that they meet meet the 90% requirement. Assuming NCT's current porfolio marks are enough, if NCT can accomplish anything even close to its first and second quarter run rate in the third and fourth quarters, a special dividend gets added to the yield pot in Q4.



Disclosures: None at the time of this writing

Mr Market trips on Mark to Market, Gives REITs Away

In this bountiful era of REIT wreckage, with liquidity having virtually disappeared from the mortgage market, the auction rate securities market, and last week, even the municipal bond market, it is helpful to be reminded of the irrationality that can sometimes rule daily trading gyrations.

According to Warren Buffett, Ben Graham said that you should imagine market quotations as coming from a remarkably accommodating fellow named Mr. Market. Without fail, Mr. Market appears daily and names a price at which he will either buy your stock or sell you his.

At times he feels euphoric. When in that mood, he sets a very high price for your stock because he fears that you will snap up his interest and rob him of imminent gains. At other times he is depressed and can see nothing but trouble ahead. On these occasions he will set a very low price for your stock, since he is terrified that you will try to unload your stocks on him, bringing him immediate losses.

Mr. Market has another endearing characteristic: He doesn't mind being ignored. Consequently, Graham said, you must heed one warning: Mr. Market is there to serve you, not to guide you. It is his pocketbook, not his wisdom, that you will find useful.

In my opinion, Mr. Market - always fallible and never perfect - is now being blind-sided by mark to market accounting. The non-cash charges resulting from these “mark to market” write downs are causing our servant Mr. Market to see nothing but trouble ahead for business and the world. Thus, he is setting a very low price for REITs and many other financial stocks, and that is creating opportunities.

In a different post, I will add more fascinating detail on the rigors of the Other Comprehensive Income account found on the balance sheet of most Mortgage REITs. For now however, suffice it to say, this is the magic "now you see it now, you don't" account for charges not affecting the income statement, because these charges are non-cash and in many cases, NOT permanent.

Furthermore, in the absence of a market for the securities held by many Mortgage REITs, most portfolio managers must use the CMBX and ABX indices to mark their portfolios to the market. As Fitch Ratings pointed out last month, the CMBX is currently indicating a default rate that is four times anything ever seen in the history of the CMBS market. So, managers must mark their portfolios to values that do not correlate with anything even close to actual performance. Does that seem rational?

Unfortunately, for REITs that are highly leveraged, these marks can also lead to margin calls which cannot be ignored – hence the aerial somersaults being performed by the funding desk at Thornburg Mortgage this week (with a perfect triple twist).

While Thornburg may yet make it (Larry Goldstone is clearly very talented and well-regarded), there are a number of well run, slightly less risky Mortgage REITs in the REITwrecks universe that Mr. Market has put on sale.

Companies such as NRF have funded nearly all of their assets on a long-term, non-recourse basis and are not subject to margin calls. They have cash available to reinvest in a vastly improved (less competitive) lending environment. Mr. Market is literally giving these stocks away, offering yields in the high teens and low twenties. Other attractive REIT stocks include AHR, NCT and RAS.

The catch? You must be able to ignore Mr. Market while you push the button and buy from him. Let him serve you, not guide you.

Disclosure: REITwrecks owns AHR, NCT and NRF

Update: More detailed information on how the "Other Comprehensive Income" account works can be found here.