Tuesday, September 2, 2008

REIT Taxable Income Definition Unlocking Opportunities?


In order to maintain qualification as a Real Estate Investment Trust, or REIT, (please see "REIT Definition" for a comprehensive definition of REITs), any entity organized as a REIT is required (among other things) to annually distribute dividends to its stockholders in an amount at least equal to 90% of taxable income (not GAAP income). This distribution requirement exempts REITs from paying income taxes at the corporate level.

The fact that a REIT must pay out 90% of its taxable income is very attractive sometimes I just wet myself! to dividend-oriented investors, but it doesn't mean that no taxes are paid on the income. Alas, those sticky-fingered Feds i'll get you my pretty! require us pay ordinary income tax on the REIT dividends we receive, not the reduced tax rate on "qualified" dividends. This is why it makes more sense to hold REITs in your 401k or IRA, rather than a regular taxable account.

In the case of many REIT Wrecks these days, the most interesting aspect of the REIT taxable income definition is that it is the result of deducting any net operating loss carryforwards that have been utilized, after offsetting any net realized capital gains with capital loss carryforwards. I first wrote about the real world implications of this in Crystal River's New Loss Driven Investment Strategy, but the implications are potentially broader than Crystal muddy waters River.

First, and quite obviously, there are numerous Mortgage REITs out there with huge extracalifragilistic realized losses on their books. These losses have led to equally huge loss carryforwards, since the losses can't be fully utilized against capital gains. There are also a few Mortgage REITs with much more cash on the books than Crystal River, and when they deploy this cash (assuming they do so prudently and without further losses), it could potentially be done in a very shareholder-friendly way.

It is a very controversial subject, and I know some well-informed readers will disagree as to the magnitude of the benefits, but the area where these loss carryforwards could be very interesting is in the case of CDO debt buybacks. Patrick Harden first wrote about the accounting related to CDO debt buybacks in his informative post The New Mortgage REIT Magic. If you're interested in more detail on how the accounting works, you should definitely read that post.

As the Mortgage REIT Journal wrote, CDO debt buybacks are generating pretty significant capital gains. However, there is one very important characteristic of these capital gains that could be very significant in the case of loss-hobbled Mortgage REITs: Since the gains can be paired with capital loss carryforwards in most cases, they may not actually produce any immediate taxable income (that hopefully comes later). Immediate taxable income would would be distributable, but since there is no immediate taxable income, one of the main obstacles to buying back REIT CDO debt is eliminated (i.e., where to come up with the cash to pay required REIT dividends on "phantom" taxable income that is suddenly higher than actual operating cash flow?).

And this is what leads to the opportunity. Quality, solvent, senior CDO debt can now be bought back at pennies on the dollar, generating very attractive cash yields, without any immediate obligation to distribute the "phantom" taxable gains. For those REITs with cash, this could be a very effective way to stabilize cash fows, and by extension, dividends.

Alone, CDO debt buybacks would not be a panacea for Mortgage REITs. However, if debt buybacks were to be paired with REIT stock repurchases and opportunistic investments in high yield mortgage debt (and dislocated CMBS), then collectively optimized relative to each other from a tax and cash flow perspective, it could be the road home for some Mortgage REITs and their fortunate shareholders.

Click here for a full Mortgage REIT list, including current dividend yields.

REIT list

Disclosures: None at the time of this writing

,,investing,,

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Wednesday, August 20, 2008

Crystal River's New Loss-Driven Investment Strategy


"The future ain't what it used to be"
Yogi Berra

Crystal River (CRZ) has had an absolutely terrible time of it. The REIT went public at $23 a share in July of 2006, and then blew through about $350 million, or almost $14 per share, in just eighteen months.

The second quarter of 2008 continued to show the unfortunate results of CRZ's ill-timed buying spree. Book value fell even further, to just $2.46/share, after another GAAP loss of almost $90 million, driven again by continued impairment charges (including remodeled future cash flows) and mark-to-market losses. The company has been steadily selling whatever decent assets it has left in order to pay down debt, and this has added insult to injury by further reducing the quality of the earnings available for shareholders.

Consequently, the Company also announced another reduction in its quarterly dividend, this time by more than half, to just $0.10/share. The Company's stock price has been marching relentlessly in one direction (south), and investors tempted to buy into this value trap even three or four months ago have been treated to nothing less than death by one million falling knives. or maybe just a nice pair of cement boots for crystal river's sea of red ink

The Company announced last quarter that it was pursuing "future strategic business opportunities", which is usually a euphemism for selling out run for the hills! or merging. Given that they called off the initiative this quarter, one can reasonably assume they found no takers.

Interestingly, however, the company did manage to generate positive operating earnings of $.67/share. The Company's CMBS portfolio was also looking pretty good, with delinquencies of less than 1% (in line with the market, but this will surely increase), no shaky interest-only loans, and no near-term maturities to worry about. Even more interesting, however, was this little nugget in their earning release: CRZ says that all these losses may actually cause the company’s operating earnings to exceed its taxable income for the next several years.

Is this bit of accounting errata of any real consequence? For this cash-starved REIT, it is potentially very significant. IRS rules require all REITs to distribute 90% of taxable income to shareholders. If there is no taxable income, there are no distributions. However, CRZ is actually generating cash earnings from operations. Because the Company is generating tax losses, this cash operating income will now be sheltered from taxes as well as the requirement to distribute it to shareholders.

There is a saying about pissing on somebody's leg and then telling them that it's actually just raining, but this oxymoronic situation could wind up being very beneficial for CRZ investors. It would give management some crucial breathing room by allowing them an opportunity to reinvest that cash in the continued reduction of short term debt, or the acquisition of new, accretive higher-yielding investments. please, not again

With access to capital in this sector reduced to zero for the foreseeable future, even something is better than nothing. Significantly, the Company's CEO, Bill Powell, announced that he would be making purchases of the stock on the open market after his blackout period ends, and he followed up with a reasonably big purchase. Reasonable, yet also pretty adventurous given CRZ's precariously thin unrestricted cash position of $2 million (the company does have access to its revolver) and the composition nuclear waste of its investment portfolio.

I personally won't be dumping any of my hard-earned clams into this disastrous bubble mania, bed-wetting poster child anytime soon, but it's becoming a more interesting story. Current shareholders may soon owe a debt of gratitute to 2006 shareholders for helping to produce what could turn out to be CRZ's most valuable asset: tax losses



Click here for an updated Mortgage REIT list, including current yields

REIT Yields

Disclosure: None at the time of this writing

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Saturday, July 26, 2008

Wrecked REITs: Don't Quote Me On It!


Alesco Financial in the land of the living dead

May 7, 2007: "As of the end of the first quarter, we had fully invested stuffed ourselves silly with dodgy Trups all of the capital raised in 2006 manic bubble mania! in asset classes which have exhibited historically low default rates and which we believe will continue to provide our investors with solid risk adjusted returns".

December 10, 2007: "We are pleased with our achievements in continuing to deliver bend over! value to shareholders" James McEntee, CEO of Alesco

Oomfa!

December 31, 2007: AFN records a "significant" GAAP net loss of $1.3 billion, or just sayin $22.48 per share and REIT status is in jeopardy.

May 8, 2008: "There can be no assurance that AFN's board will determine to maintain the dividend rate."


Face down in the Crystal River

July 26, 2006: CRZ prices initial public offering at $23 per share, a then goes on a buying spree, quickly growing the portfolio to $3.3 billion manic bubble mania yet again! in just 8 months. "With our measured quick, before they cut our fees! investment strategy, our portfolio is well-positioned to generate strong returns in 2007." Clifford Lai, President and CEO of Crystal River

2007 Results ahhh, deliverance: The Company records a net loss for the year totaling $345.9 million, or $13.86 per share, but hey, at least we lost less than those innumerate juvies over at Alesco and GAAP common equity book value per share declines to $4.48.


Deerfield Resources gets skinned

June 25, 2005: Deerfield sells 25 million shares of its common stock at $16.00 per share. The offering includes approximately 680,000 shares being sold by existing stockholders.

May 12, 2008: DFR reports a Q1 (March 31, 2008) loss of $463.6 million, or $8.43 per diluted common share. REIT status has been in jeopardy since March when DFR was forced to sell the bulk of its AAA rated RMBS portfolio. "Pricing pressure on financial assets has abated since quarter end, and we have successfully stabilized we sold everything we could and there's nothing left! our capital structure" Deerfield CEO Jonathan Trutter

June 17, 2008: DFR trades below $1.00 for 30 consecutive days, triggering a delisting notice from the NYSE.

Thornburg Mortgage finds a way

'There is no possible way' how about that way, homie! the company can lose $3.5 billion worth of long-term capital in a portfolio filled with highly rated mortgage assets.
Larry Goldstone, President & CEO, The Wall Street Journal August 7, 2007


Even (gasp!) confusion and double talk from Merrill Lynch

John Thain on January 18, 2008:"We're very confident that we have the capital base now that we need to go forward in 2008."

John Thain on March 8, 2008 "...Today I can say that we will not need additional funds. These problems are behind us we are still being sodomized [and] we will not return to the market and get sodomized twice by the Singaporeans

John Thain on March 16, 2008 "We have more capital than we need, so we can say ouch! to the market that we don't need more injections. We can confirm that we have tackled the problem"

July 28, 2008: Merrill gets tackled by Lonestar, announcing plans to raise new equity capital in an $8.5 billion public offering, along with the sale of its "super senior" CDO assets for .22 cents on the dollar.

Indeed, Merill Lynch is now behind us...

REIT to be continued,...

Click here for an updated Mortgage REIT list, including current yields

REIT dividends
Disclosure: Somehow, I managed to avoid these dogs. But I got fleas and rabies elsewhere, trust me

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